Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah v. Jerry Dee Griffiths : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; attorney for respondent.
Lynn R. Brown; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Henry Dee Griffiths, No. 860326.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1211

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STIATE OF UTAH

gfcogafc
iiBHSTATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent

•ll-l
Case N O . 860326
Category No. 2

IHtttitt DEE GRIFFITHS,

8bo

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT)
Appeal from a judgment and convictilon for Aggravated
Hllblttile'ry, a First Degree Felony, and two counits of Aggravated
•Ifettkilt, Third Degree Felonies, in the Third Judicial District, in
iiMMHiiiflor Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the| Honorable Dean E.
i|||i|de^r, Judge, presiding.

LYNN R. BR
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
333 South Second East
Salt Lake ity, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorney f r Appellant
U L. WILKINSON
nrney General
State Capitol Building
ftLake City, Utah 84114
o rnev for Respondent

JAN 51987
Clt*fk, Supreme Court, Uta^

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Cajse No. 860326
Category No. 2

JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, and two counts of Aggravated
Assault, Third Degree Felonies, in the Thiifd Judicial District, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E.
Conder, Judge, presiding.

LYNN R. BROWN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorney £or Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

*

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

1

Statement of Facts
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

POINT II:

POINT III:

CONCLUSION

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY

5

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL SINCE
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE
COUNSEL WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY MR.
GRIFFITHS TO THE POLICE BEFORE TRIAL . . .

12

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD
ACTS

15
17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES CITED
Krulewith v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949)

16

State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984)

9

State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980)

11

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985)

13,14

State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986)

10,11

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

7

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982)

8

State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984)

9

State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984)

9

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)

15

State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981)

8

State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975)

13

State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984)

9

United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 417 (3rd Cir. 1971). . . .

6

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . .

6,8

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16 (1953 as amended)

12,14

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (1983)

15

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness Performance on a
Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 191

5

Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in
the Courtroom, Crim. Def. September-October, 1977 at 5-9 .

5

Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Scientific Am.,
D e c , 1979 at 23

5

Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969 (1977)

5

Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L.
Rev. 461 (1978) .

5

Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of
Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977). . .

5

Eyewitness Identification Evidence:
7 No. Ky. L. Rev. 407 (1980)

5

Flaws and Defenses,

Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1079 (1973)

5

Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, (1979)

5

Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness
Identification, Crim. Def. May-June 1977 at 5-8 . . . . .

5

Public Defender Sourcebook, pp. 251-257 (S. Singer
ed. 1976)

5

Tyrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting
the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law 563, 575-85
(1976)

5

Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 361 (1979)

5

Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, (1979) . . .

5

STATEMENT OF ISS0ES

1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to give defendant's

requested instruction on identification testimony?
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing the State to use

statements by defendant when those statements were not provided to
defense counsel through discovery?
3.

Did the trial court err in allowing testimony concerning the

defendant's prior bad acts?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
C<ise No. 860326
Category No. 2

JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against
Jerry Dee Griffiths for one count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of
the First Degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as
amended), and two counts of Aggravated Assault, felonies of the
Third Degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70-5-103 (1953 as
amended).

A jury found the Appellant guilty following a trial held

April 17 and 18, 1986, in the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder,
Judge, presiding.
Statement of Fact^
On January 5, 1986, the employees of Rocky Mountain Video
were closing the store at approximately 7:0ti p.m. when a gunman
entered the store.

The gunman spoke first with Ron Smith, an

employee, asking if he (Smith) was the manager.

When Mr. Smith

replied that he was not the manager the gunman said, "you'll do" (R.
160) and showed Mr. Smith a gun that he was :arrying in his belt.

The gunman stated, "This is a .357 Magnum.

It's loaded.

You try to be a hero, I'll kill you" (R. 161). Mr. Smith called for
the manager, Edward Failner, who then came to the front of the
store.

The gunman then repeated the threat to Mr. Failner.

informed that there were others in the back of the store.

When

The

gunman ordered them to the front (R. 28). At that point Randy
Herbert, the owner of the store, and her husband, Everett Herbert,
came into the front of the store.
The gunman became startled when a patron deposited movies
in a night depository and pulled his gun out and pointed it at the
individuals in the store (R. 204). The gunman then forced Mr.
Failner to fill a bag with money and left the store with
approximately $300 (R. 207).
At about the same time Roger Mouritsen was down the street
from the video store purchasing gasoline (R. 236). Mr. Mouritsen
heard what he thought was a shot and then saw a man running
diagonally across the street with a noticeable limp (R. 237).
When the police arrived Mr. Smith described the gunman as
having shoulder length dirty blonde hair, no beard and maybe a small
moustache (R. 169). Mr. Smith also testified that the gunman had an
upper tooth missing (R. 177). Mr. Failner described the gunman as
having long dirty blond hair, three days growth of beard, no real
moustache, and as having a missing tooth (R. 202). Mr. Herbert also
testified that the gunman had a missing tooth (R. 287).
On January 6, 1986, Jerry Griffiths sought medical
attention for a gunshot wound in the instep of his right foot (R.
138).

Dr. Sherman Smith treated Mr. Griffiths and testified that

- 2 -

Mr. Griffiths explained that he had received the wound when
exchanging a gun with a friend (R. 138). Darlene Newsome, Mr.
Griffiths1 girlfriend, also testified that she witnessed the
exchange in which Mr. Griffiths was injured on January 4, 1986 (R.
330).

Two other witnesses testified that they saw Mr. Griffiths on

the morning of January 5 and that he did have an injured foot at
that time (R. 304, 324). Dr. Smith testified that on January 6,
1986 Mr. Griffiths had a "very exaggerated moustache" (R. 142). Dr.
Smith called the authorities (R. 150) and Mr. Griffiths was later
arrested on January 10, 1986.
At the time of his arrest Mr. Griffiths made statements to
I
Detective Ron Edwards who later testified ^t trial (R. 358). These
statements were not part of the discovery that was provided before
trial.

When these statements were used at trial, defense counsel

moved for a mistrial but that motion was denied (R. 390, 393). Mr.
Edwards also testified that at the time he arrested Mr. Griffiths,
another arrest warrant was outstanding (R. 253). The court
admonished the jury to disregard that statement (R. 254).
The police held a lineup on February 4, 1986, for the
witnesses of the robbery.

At that time Mr. Smith and Mr. Herbert

were unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (R. 173, 287).
Ms. Herbert positively identified a member of the lineup other than
Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (R. 272). The only witness who
identified Mr. Griffiths at the lineup was Mr. Failner (R. 213).
All of the witnesses subsequently identified Mr. Griffiths
as the gunman at trial.

The fact was also noted at trial that Mr.

Griffiths had a full upper dental plate (R. 302). All of the

- 3 -

witnesses to the robbery testified that their assailant had a
missing upper tooth.
At trial Yvonne Silcox was allowed to testify that she had
seen Mr. Griffiths on December 23, 1985 (R. 226). Defense counsel
objected to her testimony because she was a victim of another
robbery with which Mr. Griffiths was charged (R. 153). While Ms.
Silcox did not testify concerning the facts of this prior robbery,
she did testify that she had picked Mr. Griffiths from a police
lineup (R. 227) and described Mr. Griffiths appearance in late
December.
At the close of the evidence defense counsel requested a
jury instruction concerning eyewitness identification (R. 063)
(Addendum A).

The instruction was not given and defense counsel

objected (R. 391).
Following the trial to the jury Mr. Griffiths was found
guilty of Aggravated Robbery and two counts of Aggravated Assault.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant, Jerry Dee Griffiths, first contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on
eyewitness identification.

In light of the tenuous identification

of Mr. Griffiths, the court abused its discretion in refusing such
an instruction.
The Appellant contends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by allowing into evidence statements made by Mr.
Griffiths at the time of his arrest because these statements were
not provided to defense counsel through the discovery process.
Finally, Mr. Griffiths argues that testimony concerning
prior bad acts by him was improperly allowed into evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L C Q U R T C Q M M I T T E D PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
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' Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev,
969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978);
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky.
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of
Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use oT~
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q.
361 (1979). Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, Ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology
of Eyewitness Testimony, (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of
Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y
191; Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the
Courtroom, Crim. Def., September-October, 1977 at 5-9; Buckhout,
Eyewitness Testimony, Scientific Am., Dec. 1974 at 23; Ellis, Davies
& Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face Identification, N a t M J.
Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Levin & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal
Identification; The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 107 9
(1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identification,
Crim. Def., May-June, 1977 at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law.
563 , 575-85 (1976).

In a frequently quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter,
former United States Supreme Court Justice, observed:
What is the worth of identification testimony
even when uncontradicted? The identification of
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy* The
hazards of such testimony are established by a
formidable number of instances in the records of
English and American trials. These instances are
recent—not due to the brutalities of ancient
criminal procedure. . .
Evidence as to identity based on personal
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all
classes of evidence the least to be relied upon,
and therefore, unless supported by other facts,
an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury.
Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti.
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 417, 527 (3rd Cir.
1971), the court examined the processes involved in human
observations and came to the conclusion that:
. . . where the circumstances surrounding the
criminal act gave limited opportunity for
observation or utilization of the sensory
perception, or where uncertainty is expressed by
the witness himself, or exposed by a past history
of the witnessfs statements or demonstrated
identity should be considered as only an
expression of opinion and should be accompanied
by appropriate instructions as to its sufficiency
and weight.
The instructions requested in the present case were very
similar to the model instruction fashioned in United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

The Telfaire Court in

describing the need for such an instruction, stated:
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the
common law system must be a premise that is
realized in instruction and not merely a
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have
pointed out the importance of and need for
special instruction on the key issue of
identification, which emphasized to the jury the
need for finding that the circumstances of the
identification are convincing beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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The Telfaire instruction was cited with approval by Justice
Stewart in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Durham, in
State v, Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982).

In that case the

majority opinion did not squarely address the issue of the
requirement of such an instruction.

This Court did not find

reversible error in the trial court's refusal to give the
instruction.

The Court stated, "We have not heretofore held that

such an instruction is required.

We believe the giving of it should

be left to the discretion of the trial court."

_I_d. at 61.

In State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981), this Court
held that given the circumstances of that case, it was not
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give a Telfaire
instruction.

The Court did not say that no error was committed.

Id. at 1187. However, Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, noted,
"Although the majority opinion takes the 'instructions as a whole'
and reaches its conclusion that they adequately advise the jury, the
instructions are nothing more than boiler plate statements
concerning burden of proof which do not deal with the problem at
all."

Ijd. at 1189.
Similarly, in the present appeal, the instructions given to

the jury were merely standard burden of proof instructions, and
therefore failed to address the special problems associated with
eyewitness identification.
Prior to Long four Utah cases addressed the issue of
eyewitness identification.

Each of the cases continued to support

the proposition that the giving of cautionary jury instructions
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In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court
found an abuse of discretion by a trial court in refusing to give a
requested cautionary instruction.

In Jonas the victim had only seen

his assailant for a few seconds at night before being knocked
unconscious.

In a concurring opinion to Jonas, Justice Stewart

mentioned that, "[T]he jury should know that it should carefully
assess the witness and all prior identification he had made to
determine what weight should be given the identification."

I_d. at

1381.
In this case four witnesses were present at the robbery of
Rocky Mountain Video.

Of these four witnesses only one was able to

identify Mr. Griffiths in a lineup held on February 4, 1986. The
description given by witness Ron Smith was that his assailant had
shoulder-length dirty blond hair, no beard, and maybe a small
moustache (R. 169). He also stated that the assailant had a tooth
missing from his upper teeth (R. 177). However, Mr. Smith was
unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as his assailant at the lineup of
February 4 (R. 173) but later identified Mr. Griffiths as his
assailant at trial (R. 192).
Edward Failner, the manager of Rocky Mountain Video, also
described the assailant as having long, dirty blonde hair, three
days growth of facial hair with no real moustache, and having a
missing tooth (R. 202). Mr. Failner was the only witness who
identified Mr. Griffiths at the February 4 lineup (R. 213).
Randy Herbert, the owner of the video store, not only
failed to identify Mr. Griffiths at the February 4 lineup but
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identifications to determine what weight should be given the
identification" 725 P.2d at 1375.

In this case with so much

depending on eyewitness testimony, the jury should have been
informed about the dangers of such testimony.

In the absence of

physical evidence, the defendant is entitled to inform the jury of
the factors which affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO
PROVIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY
MR. GRIFFITHS TO THE POLICE BEFORE TRIAL.
Before trial, defense counsel submitted a request for
discovery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(a) (1953 as amended)
(R. 17-19).

Section 77-35-16(a) provides:

Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has
knowledge.
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of
the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant
or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
Defense counsel specifically requested "all written or recorded
statements of the defendant" (R. 017) (Addendum B).
In response to the discovery request, defense counsel was
presented with some police reports but none containing any
statements made by Mr. Griffiths.

Minutes before trial, the
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pursuant to §77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must
comply. To meet basic standards of fairness and
to ensure that a trial is a real quest for truth
and not simply a contest between the parties to
win, a defendant's request for information which
has been voluntarily complied with, or a court
order of discovery must be deemed to be deemed a
continuing request. And even though there is no
court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory
information which falls with the ambit of
§77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead
defendants to cause prejudicial error.
Id. at 662.
In the instant case the prosecutor's failure to provide
defense counsel with statements made by Mr. Griffiths to the police
after his arrest clearly denied him a fair trial.

Defense counsel

made a request for discovery under Utah Code Ann. §77-35~16(a) which
provides specifically for the disclosure of any "relevant written or
recorded statements of the defendant."
The statements by Mr. Griffiths to the police were used by
the prosecution in this case to discredit Mr. Griffiths' alibi and
to contradict the testimony of Darlene Newsome.

Ms. Newsome

testified that Mr. Griffiths had been injured when exchanging a gun
with a man named Dan or Don (R. 332). Mr. Griffiths told the police
that the man's name was Mike (R. 363). This type of impeachment was
typical of the manner in which Mr. Griffiths' statements were used
against him.

This is not the type of material a prosecutor will

fail to recognize as significant to the defense yet the prosecutor
in this case waited until moments before trial to present these
statements to defense counsel.
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The use of these supplemental police reports against Mr.
Griffiths turned the trial in this matter into an "adversarial
contest between two competing sides."

By failing to disclose the

requested material the prosecutor so misled the defense as to cause
prejudicial error.

The non-disclosed statements in this case were

vital to the verdict that was rendered.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS.
The general rule regarding the admission into evidence of
other offenses or similar acts is summarized in State v. Saunders,
699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985):
[4] The basis of these limitations on the
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused
because of bad character rather than because he
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged.
Because of this tendency, such evidence is
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the
admission of the evidence other than to show
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded.
(Citations omitted.)
In Utah the rule that governs this type of evidence is Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
This court in reversing the conviction in Saunders was well
aware of the harm that is presented when evidence of prior bad acts
is allowed into evidence.
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In the instant case the Appellant was prejudiced by two
forms of prior bad act testimony.

The first was the testimony of

Detective Ron Edwards that he advised the Appellant at the time of
his arrest of "another warrant out of West Valley" (R. 253). This
testimony allowed the jury to know that the Appellant was a suspect
in a totally unrelated case.
disregard the statement.

The trial court admonished the jury to

The fact that such an admonition was given

does not detract from the prejudice that the Appellant suffered.
Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion in Krulewith v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) stated, "The naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury...
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
The other example of prior bad acts admitted into evidence
was the testimony of Yvonne Silcox.

Ms. Silcox was the victim of an

unrelated robbery in December, 1985 (R. 153), and she was allowed to
testify about the Appellant's appearance at that time.

Ms. Silcox

also testified that she attended the police lineup in this case (R.
227) .
Allowing Ms. Silcox to testify about attending a police
lineup and identifying the defendant at that lineup inferred that
she also was a victim of a robbery.

The trial court, by allowing

this inference, prejudiced the defendant in the minds of the
jurors.

The jury was aware that only victims generally attend

lineups.

By allowing this testimony the trial court allowed

evidence of a prior bad act not relevant to the case at trial.
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The prejudice these admissions caused the Appellant is
clear.

The jury was allowed to consider Mr. Griffiths1 bad

character rather than any evidence of the robbery for which he was
tried.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Jerry Dee Griffiths, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the
charges or a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

M*

^mm

£-—day

of January, 1987.

JL&:
R. BROWN

^Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LYNN R. BROWN, do hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellantfs Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

X

day of January, 1987.

yruu R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED by
January, 1987.

this

day of

ADDENDUM A

INSTRUCTION NO.

One of the important issues of this case is the
identification of the Defendant.

The State has the burden of

proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness.

In this case, the witness has

testified that he recognized JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS as a
participant in the crime.

You must decide whether there is a

reasonable doubt in this identification.

In appraising the

identification testimony, you should consider the following:
1.

Did the witness have the capacity and opportunity

to observe the offender?
2.

Is the identification made by the witness a

product of his own recollection?
3.

Has the witness failed to identify the defendant

on a previous occasion?
4.

Is the identification witness credible?

If, after considering these factors, you have a
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification you
must find the Defendant, JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS, not guilty.

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
United States v. Barger, 442 P.2d 517 (3rd Cir. 1971)
Macklin v. United States, 409P.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 399 N.E. 2d 482 (Mass. 1980)

INSTRUCTION NO.

One of the important issues in this case is the
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime.

The State has the burden of proving identity, beyond a

reasonable doubt.

It is not essential that the witness himself

be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement.
However, you the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant
before you may convict him.

If you are not convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness.

Its value depends on the

opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time
of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a
witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to
observe the offender at the time of the offense will be
affected by such matters as how long or short a time was
available, how far or close the witness was, how good were
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to
see or know the person in the past.

(2)

Are you satisfied that the identification made by

the witness after the offense was the product of his own
recollection?

You may take into account both the strength of

the identification, and the circumstances under which the
identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the
identification with great care.

You may also consider the

length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime
and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
(3)

You may take into account any occasions in which

the witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or
made an identification that was inconsistent with this
identification at trial.
(4)

Finally, you must consider the credibility of

each identification witness in the same way as any other
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether
he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable
observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof
on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as
perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged.

If

after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as
to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the
defendant not guilty.

ADDENDUM B

LYNN R. BROWN (#0460)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

2 8 1986
H DixcWtmcifey, Clerk 3ra Dist Court
BT-

7&.rVoufv OJprk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICtAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO DISCOVER AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff
-vJERRY DEE GRIFFITHS,
Defendant

Case No. CR36- 1 8 l ^ j 3 R 8 6 - 183JD
CR86-134, CR86-185
( J u d g e Dean E . Conder)

COMES NOW the Defendant by and through Defense
Counsel and requests the following material be provided to them
as discovery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16, Bradv v.
Maryland, 337 U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S.
97 (1976) and Due Process required by the Constitutions of
Utah and the United States:
1.

All police reports concerning this investigation

of the above entitled cases;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the

Defendant, if any;
3.

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

4.

All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of

Defendant;

the Defendant;
5.

The date and time the robbery happened;

6.

Any evidence tending to mitigate the degree

of the offense for reduced punishment;
7.

All witnesses, names and addresses which the State

may call at the time of the trial; and
8.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-5(b), the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the Defendant is reauired to
plead.
~ATED this <P"7

day of February, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,

*V£VNN R. BROWN
^
^ Attorney for Defendant

-2-

